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Industrial Growth:
A Comparison with the United States
THE Soviet record of industrial growth may be placed in perspective
by comparing it with the record of other countries. This is not so easy as
it might seem, not only because it is difficult to design relevant com-
parisons, but also because so little is known about the course of industrial
development in most countries. The latter factor alone has forced us,
with our limited time and resources, to concentrate on comparisons with
the United States, a country with relatively abundant historical statistics.
The United States is an obvious first choice for comparative study in any
case, since it presents a striking contrast in economic system while being
similar in size and resource endowment. But while a comparative study
reasonably starts with the United States, it should not end there, and we
may hope that others will take up where we have left off.
Comparative study may help us in answering two quite different
questions.First, we are interested in knowing, for a variety of reasons
associated with the current state of world affairs, which country has
shown the more rapid industrial growth over recent years, so that we may
have some basis for intelligent guesses about relative growth over the
very near future. Second, we are interested in knowing which country
has been able to generate the more rapid industrial growth under condi-
tions in which "physical" capacities for growth have been roughly
equivalent.Our quest here isfor a more fundamental test of the
growth-generatingefficiencyof vastlydifferenteconomicsystems
under comparable circumstances, a matter of concern for the longer
view.
The first question is obviously easier to deal with than the second,
because it requires only a description of the "facts" of growth in the two
countries over the same span of years. Of course, the facts are in dispute,
and the quantitative evidence of growth is more representative and
reliable for the United States than for the Soviet Union. But this problem
must always be faced, whether the issues at hand are analytical or purely
descriptive. The essential point is that, in making comparisons of con-
current growth trends, we are primarily concerned with what is or has
been happening, not why. Our attention is focused on trends likely to be
carried forward over an immediate future by their own momentum, in
the absence of revolutionary change in conditioning factors.
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The second question involves a complex problem of analysis that by
its very nature defies definitive solution. We try to find historical periods
in two countries in which the important determinants of growth are the
same in both cases, while the economic systems differ. To do this we
need to know, first, what factors affect growth in what degrees and, second,
what periods of history in the two countries are comparable. Neither
economic theory nor history blesses our task: theory is mute and history
mischievous. At best, the periods chosen will be "comparable" only in
some rather crude sense. Even so, the exercise is worth doing, as an early
step in the successive approximations that mark the path to knowledge.
If industrial economies do go through comparable stages of develop-
ment in some meaningful sense, setting those American and Soviet
periods side by side carries with it an important by-product:it enables
us to project Soviet developments into a context with which we are more
familiar, and thereby to reason by analogy in directions where direct
evidence is lacking. There are also great hazards in reasoning by analogy,
but judiciously applied it enriches our knowledge of the likely growth and
present status of Soviet industry. Our vision of Soviet industrial growth
is clarified by associating it with American developments bracketing the
turn of the century, but at the same time the analogy must not be taken
too far. The sets of industrial conditions in the two periods abound with
anachronisms relative to each other.
Contemporaneous Growth
PRODUCTION
Over the same spans of years, industrial output has generally grown
faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States (see Tables 61 and
62 and Chart 25).' This seems to be an old story since it was apparently
true of the Tsarist era as well:according to our indexes, Russian
industry grew slightly faster than American industry over the period
1870—1913, the respective average annual rates being 5.3 and 5.1 per
cent. The differential is similar for the Soviet period as a whole: output
grew over 19 13—1955 at an average annual rate of 4.1 per cent in the
Soviet Union, when adjusted to remove territorial gains, compared with
3.8 per cent in the United States. Growth including territorial gains has
apparently been faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States for
all major sectors of industry except food and allied products (see Table
65).If territorial gains were removed, chemicals and textiles and allied
1Throughoutthese comparisons, industry is defined in accord with Soviet usage,
including manufacturing, mining, logging, fishing, and generating of electricity.
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TABLE 61
INDEXES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOR, AND OUTPur PER CAPITA:














































































































a 1860—1913, Table A-iS, Borenstein-Goldsmith index with imputed weights; 1913—1955, Table 53,
moving-weight index for all products. 1920 interpolated by indexes for industrial materials in Table 47.





From population as given in Table C-S.
From population as given in Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to1957,
Washington, 1960.
g Adjusted to exclude territorial gains (estimated as 11 per cent of production beginning with 1940,
as explained in Chapter 6), these figures would be as follows:1940, 286;1945, 184;1950, 354;
and 1955, 558.
h Output is probably exaggerated significantly because of difficulties in measuring output of military
products (see Table A-32 and section on military products in Chapter 5).
products would probably be additional exceptions.
Over the Plan period Soviet growth in percentage terms has out-
distanced U.S. growth by a wider margin, making up for a differential






















































































































































sA COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES
TABLE 62
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOR, AND














































































SOURCE: Table 61.For Soviet Union, figures on output adjusted to exclude territorial gains.
Average annual growth rates calculated from data for terminal years by the compound interest
formula.
about the same rate over both sets of years—namely, 3.7 or 3.8 per cent
a year—while the Soviet rate rose from 0.1 per cent for the pre-Plan
years to 6.5 per cent for the Plan years, territorial gains excluded.In
turn, relative performance has varied within the Plan period itself.
Over 1928-1940, industrial output grew 8.9 per cent a year in the Soviet
Union, compared with only 1.8 per cent in the United States, reflecting
accelerated activity in the one case and depressed activity in the other.2
Over 1940--1955, on the other hand, the average annual growth rate was
higher in the United States than in the Soviet Union:5.4 per cent
compared with 4.6 per cent.
Moving to the recent postwar years 1950—1955, we find the Soviet
growth rate of 9.6 per cent a year exceeding the American rate of 5.3
per cent by a significant margin. A discrepancy in favor of the Soviet
Union has persisted through 1958, though the Soviet growth rate has
declined to around 7.1 per cent as far as one can see from the published
data (see Table 68, industrial materials).It is too early to say whether
2Ifone starts from the bottom of the Great Depression, competing growth rates may
be found for the United States: 7.0 per cent for 1932—1955 and 9.9 per cent for 1932—1940.
The parallel is not wholly far-fetched, since Soviet growth started with a large reserve of
employable resources in 1928.
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the decline is permanent or only temporary, whether this reflects a per-
sistent retardation or a temporary fluctuation.It is also too early to say
what is happening to the tempo of American industrial growth, which
averaged only 2.2 per cent a year over 1955—1959. In any case, the record
for postwar years and for other peacetime• years in the Plan period
suggests that Soviet industrial growth will continue to be more rapid
than U.S. growth over the near future.
We commented in the two preceding chapters on the apparent retarda-
tion in Soviet industrial growth, both between the Tsarist and Soviet
periods and within the Soviet period. A similar retardation seems to
apply to U.S. growth over the two periods of forty-odd years before and
after the second decade of the 1900's. However, there are few signs that
growth has continued to retard over the more recent long period:the
growth rate for 1928—1955 is about the same as for
PRODUCTION AND POPULATION
The picture of comparative growth in output per head of population is
much the same as what we have just sketched for total output (see Chart
26). However, population has grown more slowly in the Soviet Union
than in the United States:1.5 per cent a year over 1870—1913 compared
with 2.1 per cent, and 0.9 per cent over 1913—1955 compared with 1.3
per cent.For this reason, the per capita growth rates show a larger
discrepancy in favor of the Soviet Union than the total growth rates.
This result points up a defect in making international comparisons
of per capita growth rates without taking account of the growth in popu-
lation by itself.Population growth in the United States, from both
internal and external sources, has been directly related to economic
progress. This has not been the case in the Soviet Union. In fact, the
economic policies of the 1920's and 1930's—and probably the immediate
postwar period—directly caused population to grow much more slowly
than otherwise, and even to decline temporarily. Of course, the huge
wartime losses had the same effect, though they fall into another category.
In any case, population has not been a factor limiting growth significantly
in the Soviet Union, because a large segment of the population has been
"underemployed" in relation to available technology.Hence output
In my earlier report (Some Observations on Soviet industrial Growth, NBER Occasional
Paper 55, New York, 1957, p. 625), I argued that there was little evidence of a long-run
tendency for U.S. industrial growth to retard. This conclusion now appears to have been
too strong, since retardation shows up clearly in measured growth.It may still be, of
course, that measures for the nineteenth century have an upward bias relative to those for
the twentieth, but this would not affect the conclusions drawn here in comparing the Soviet









































































































































































per capita could increase as a consequence of a slower growth in popula-
tion. Put the other way around, the growth in per capita output almost
certainly would have been slower if the population had grown faster.
This would not have applied—at least not with the same force—to the
United States.
PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT
Except for the periods 1928—1937 and 1950—1955, industrial labor pro-
ductivity, as we have been able to measure it, has grown faster in the
United States than in the Soviet Union (see Table 62 and Chart 27).
In the United States, growth in industrial output has come primarily
from improved labor productivity: had there been no improvement in
output per man-hour (or person engaged), output would have multiplied
31 (or 42) per cent as much as it did over 1913—1955 and 52 (or 58) per
cent as much over 1928—1955. That is, improved labor productivity
accounted for 58 to 69 per cent of the multiplication in output over
1913—1955 and for 42 to 48 per cent over 1928—1955, the percentage
depending on whether productivity is measured in terms of persons
engaged or man-hours.By contrast, improved labor productivity
accounted for only 46 to 54percent of the multiplication in Soviet output
over 1913—1955 and for only 37 to 40 per cent over 1928—1955.
Thefaster growth in labor productivity on the part of the United States
held generally throughout industrial groups (see Table 65). In terms of
output per person engaged—the only measure we can make for Soviet
industrial groups—Soviet growth over 1913—1955 was faster than U.S.
growth over a similar period, 1909—1953, only in the cases of metals
(3.2 per cent a year compared with 1.2 per cent) and machinery and allied
products (3.1 per cent compared with 2.0 per cent). Soviet growth rates
on a man-hour basis were undoubtedly also higher in these sectors than
U.S. rates.4 Over 1928—1 955, Soviet growth in output per person engaged
was faster than U.S. growth over 1929—1953 in only four industrial groups:
the two already mentioned plus fuel and textiles and allied products.
In the last two cases, however, Soviet growth was almost certainly slower
than U.S. growth on a man-hour basis.5
If it were assumed that the average annual hours of work changed in these Soviet
industrial groups by the same percentage as for all industry, the Soviet growth rates on
a man-hour basis would be higher than the U.S. rates:3.6 per cent compared with 1.7
per cent in the case of metals, and 3.5 per cent compared with 2.4 per cent in the case of
machinery and allied products. The U.S. rates are computed from data in Table A-37.
On the same assumption about Soviet man-hours as given in the preceding footnote,
the average annual growth rate for output per man-hour would be 3.0 per cent for the
Soviet Union compared with 3.4 per cent for the United States in the case of fuel, and
1.0 per cent compared with 1.9 per cent in the case of textiles and allied products.
232CHART 27
Indexes of Output, Employment, and Output per Unit of Labor,
by Industrial Group: Soviet Union (1913—1955)
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Source; Tables A-24 A.36, A-37, and Table 40
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It is not at all clear whether there is any trend in the growth rate of
labor productivity in either of the two countries.If we concentrate on
output per man-hour, which seems to be the more meaningful measure,
we note (Table 62) that the growth rates for both countries declined
between 1913—1928 and 1928—1955, but increased between 1928—1940 and
1940—1955 and between 1928—1937 and 1950—1955.Under these
circumstances, the wisest conclusion is that more time and evidence is
needed to discover whether there is any long-run drift in these growth
rates. 6
Thenext and obvious step in a study of growth in labor productivity
is to analyze the causes, particularly the role played by the substitution of
capital for labor. We are just reaching the stage of knowing something
tolerably reliable about the relations among capital inputs, labor inputs,
and output during the economic history of the United States. In the recent
important work by John W. Kendrick, the ratio of output to capital in
U.S. manufacturing and mining is measured as increasing at the average
annual rate of 1.0 and 1.3 per cent over 1899—1953, and the ratio of
capital to labor at 1.2 per cent.7 Unfortunately, the poor state of statistics
on Soviet capital inputs does not permit equally reliable calculations.
A very recent report by Norman Kaplan and Richard Moorsteen reaches
the tentative conclusion, based on deficient data, that the stock of Soviet
industrial capital grew steadily and considerably faster than output over
1 928—i 955, though the divergence may have diminished significantly over
1950_1955.8 In any case, if we were to assume that Soviet capital grew
at least as fast as output, the ratio of capital to labor (man-hours) would
be found to have grown at an average annual rate of at least 1.9 per cent
over 1913—1955, or considerably faster than for the United States over
1899—1953. Put another way, the Soviet Union has apparently had a
considerably larger percentage growth in its stock of industrial capital
than the United States, but a significantly smaller percentage growth in
labor (and capital) productivity.
6Ina recent paper, I drew the conclusion that U.S. growth in labor productivity had
been retarding in recent years (see my "The Structure and Growth of Soviet Industry:
A Comparison with the United States," in Comparisons of the United States and Soviet
Economies, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1959,
pp. 112 and 120, and also in Journal of Law and Economics, October 1959, pp. 164 and
174). A more careful reading of the evidence suggests that this conclusion was hasty and
incautious. While it is true that both output and labor productivity have grown much
more slowly since 1955 than over 1950—1955, this is too limited an experience for such a
sweeping conclusion. There appears to be no other evidence of retardation, at least since
1928.
Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton for NBER, 1961, pp. 166 and 148.
8"Indexesof Soviet Industrial Output" (mimeographed), RAND Corporation,
RM-2495, Santa Monica, 1960, pp. 179 if and 272.
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COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF PRODUCTION, POPULATION,
AND EMPLOYMENT
The comparisons so far have been based on various indexes computed
directly for each country, and they can be roughly checked by another,
essentially independent set of estimates that at the same time reveals some
interesting information of its own. Evaluating the value added of industry
in both rubles and dollars for each country, we may estimate Soviet
industrial production as a fraction of the U.S. level in 1913, 1928, and
1955. The estimates represent only orders of magnitude; constructed in
different ways and with better data, they might vary as much as 10 per
cent, possibly more, in either direction. For example, U.S. products are
generally of better quality than Russian counterparts, and the differential
has tended to widen over the Soviet period, except in special cases of
machinery and military products. Yet both U.S. and Soviet products are
evaluated atthe same prices,thus overstating Soviet production.
Similarly, both the output and value of Soviet products tend to be over-
stated in official statistics. Other errors of unknown direction are intro-
duced by estimative procedures.9Despite such shortcomings, these
estimates cannot be dismissed as inherently worse than other summary
indexes calculated for the Soviet Union.
According to these estimates (Table 63), Soviet industrial output rose
from 11 to 14 per cent of the American level in 1913 up to 20 to 23 per cent
in 1955; similarly, otltput per head of population rose from 7 to 10 per
cent up to 17 to 20 per cent. On the other hand, output per person
engaged changed little, from 17 to 22 per cent up to 19 to 22 per cent,
and output per man-hour from 18 to 24 per cent down to 18 to 21 per cent.
In each pair of numbers, the lower one is based on a valuation in ruble
prices.These findings are generally consistent with our more direct
calculations, which indicated that industrial output and output per
°Perhapsthe least reliable datum in Table 63 is the estimate of Soviet value added in
1955.This has been taken as the sum of employee compensation, profits, and net
"commercial" and unallocated outlays, all of which are rather indirectly derived (see
Table F-3).In view of the questionable "rationality" of Soviet pricing and allocative
policies, none of these magnitudes can be taken as a reliable measure, by Western
standards, of the element of productive activity it seems to represent. This is particularly
true of the magnitudes taken to measure the productive contribution of capital (profits
and other net outlays), since Soviet authorities avowedly make no effort to compensate
capital services on the basis of their alternative costs.
Another possible procedure for 1955 would be to compare only the outlays for employee
compensation in U.S. and Soviet industry, which amounts to assuming that employee
compensation was the same percentage of value added in both countries. By this proce-
dure (explained in note d of Table 63), Soviet value added in 1955 would be derived as















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A COMPARISON WITH THE UNiTED STATES
capita grew faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States, while
labor productivity grew slower.
At the same time, they imply more rapid growth for Soviet industry
than our direct indexes. In the case of value added evaluated in dollars,
Soviet growth is indicated as about 60 per cent faster than American
growth over 1913—1955; in the case of value added per capita similarly
evaluated, about 100 per cent faster. Hence, if we calculate Soviet growth
indirectly on the basis of the U.S. production index, Soviet output is
indicated as multiplying 7.5 times (6.7 times excluding territorial gains)
and per capita output, 5.6 times. By direct calculations, the two multiples
are 6.2 (5.6 excluding territorial gains) and 4.3, respectively.
Put alternatively, output is shown as growing at 4.9 per cent a year when
calculated indirectly, compared with 4.4 per cent when calculated directly;
excluding territorial gains, the two rates are 4.6 and 4.1 per cent.
Similarly, growth in per capita output is calculated indirectly as 4.1 per
cent a year and directly as 3.5 per cent; growth in output per person
engaged, as 1.9 and 1.5 per cent; and growth in output per man-hour,
as 2.3 and 1.9 per cent.
The disparity in the results between direct and indirect measures of
Soviet industrial growth is somewhat reduced if we make the indirect
measure in terms of value added in constant dollars. By this procedure
(see the upper part of Table 64), Soviet output is shown as multiplying
7.1 times over 1913—1955 and 6.3 times over 1928—1955, compared with
6.2 and 6.1 times as shown by our production index for all products.
Incidentally, the multiplication in U.S. output over both periods is not
Notes to Table 63 (continued)
Line
1 Soviet Union: Line 2 divided by ruble-dollar ratio with Soviet output weights.
For 1913 and 1928, ratio for basic sample of forty-five industries (Table A-30);
for 1955, estimated weighted ratio for all industry (Table A-31).
United States: Table A.42.
2 Soviet Union: Table A-43.
United States: Line 1 multiplied by ruble-dollar ratio with U.S. output weights.
For coverage of ratios used, see line 1, Soviet Union.
3 Soviet Union: Table A-20.
United States: Table A-36.
4 Soviet Union: Table A-23.
United States: Table A-36.
5 Soviet Union: Table C-3.
United States: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958, Washington, 1958, p. 5.
Continental United States.
6,7Line 1 or 2 divided by line 3.
8,9 Line I or 2 divided by line 4.
10, 11Line 1 or 2 divided by line 5.
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TABLE 64
COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF INDUSTRIAL VALUE ADDED IN CONSTANT DOLLARS:
SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES, 1913, 1928, AND 1955
(billion 1954 dollars)
1913 1928 1955
Deflated value added a
United States 34.9 61.7 150.7
Soviet Union 5.0 5.6 35.3
Gap (U.S. minus S.U.) 29.9 56.1 115.4
Projected value addedb
United States 31.9 54.9 150.7
Soviet Union 5.7 5.8 35.3
Gap (U.S. minus S.U.) 26.2 49.1 115.4
a Valueadded in Table 63 deflated by price indexes. For the United States, price
index is for manufacturing (1914, 35.0;1929, 54.8;1954, 100.0) and is taken as NBER
index (D. Creamer, S. P. Dobrovolsky, and I. Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing and
Mining, Its Formation and Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1960, P. 261) extrapolated from
1948 by BLS index (Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957, Washing-
ton, 1960, Series E-59, p. 118).For the Soviet Union, price index (1914, 34.2;1929,
56.1;1954, 100.0) is derived implicitly from value added for forty-five Soviet industries
in "current" and constant dollars. Data in "current" dollars are from Table A-26; in
constant dollars, from same table as projected by production indexes for Soviet industrial
materials with appropriate U.S. weights (see Table 21). Price index is chained for links
1913—1928 and 1928—1955, and each link is taken as the geometric average of the two
possible implicit price indexes.
b1955value added for each country (in 1954 dollars) projected by production index
for all industrial products (Table 61).
larger but smaller when measured by the same indirect procedure than
when measured by our production index: 4.3 and 2.4 times, compared
with 4.7 and 2.8 times.
By way of digression, we should note an important point that emerges
from these estimates of value added in constant dollars (Table 64):
namely, that the absolute gap between U.S. and Soviet output has
steadily grown despite the narrowing in the relative gap. This simply
means that the absolute increase in production has been larger in the
United States than in the Soviet Union even though the percentage
increase has been smaller. By our estimates, the gap in value added
measured in 1954 dollars grew by $85 to $90 billion (or by 285 to 340
per cent) between 1913 and 1955 and by $60 to $65 billion (or by 105
to 135 per cent) between 1928 and 1955. In this sense, U.S. growth has
exceeded Soviet growth by a wide margin.
Returning to the question of discrepancies between direct and indirect
measures of percentage growth, we may observe that differences of the
order of magnitude shown by our various estimates for the Soviet Union
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should not be surprising, given the problems in making accurate and
meaningful measures.It is, however, much more difficult to reconcile
our figures with the conventional Western estimate—and apparently the
latest official Soviet position—that Soviet industrial production was about
a third of the U.S. level in.1955.'°Since, to our knowledge, a full
explanation of this widely accepted estimate has never been published, we
cannot easily analyze the reasons for the substantial divergence from our
estimates. From context, it would seem that the conventional estimate
has been derived from inspection of physical output ratios for a list of
commodities that can be compared,1' a method that can be quite mis-
leading for reasons we shall explore later.
For the moment we may point out the implications of this conventional
estimate. Taken together with the widely accepted estimate that Russian
industrial production, within Soviet boundaries, was 11 to 14 per cent of
the U.S. level in 1913,12 the conventional estimate for 1955 implies that
industrial production multiplied 2.4 to 3 times as much in the Soviet
Union as in the United States between 1913 and 1955.Since U.S.
production multiplied 4.7 times, it would follow that Soviet production
multiplied 11 to 14 times, a factor much higher than is shown by any
index constructed in the West except that of Seton (see Table 33).
It is about twice as high as is shown by our moving-weight index for all
products.
The conventional estimate also implies that the 1955 value added of
Soviet industry amounted to around $50 billion or, multiplying by a
ruble-dollar price ratio of 7.3(see Table A-31), 370 billion rubles.
Since employee compensation seems to have been around 150 billion
rubles (see Table F-3), it is implied to be 40 per cent of total value added.
In U.S. manufacturing, employee compensation has amounted to around
55 per cent of total value added.'3It is difficult to believe that labor
services in the Soviet Union could be relatively so much less important,
or capital services so much more important, than in the United States.
10See,e.g., Soviet Economic Growth: A Comparison with the United States, Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1957, p. 11. The most recent
official Soviet position is that their industrial output was about half the U.S. level in
1958 (see footnote 24 in Chapter 2). Projecting this backward to 1955 by the ratio of the
official Soviet to the Federal Reserve Board production index, we find a fraction of
36 per cent for that year.
11Thisprocedure is followed by Professor Roif Wagenfuhr in his recent article, "Der
Wettlauf der Grossmachte," Frankfurter Ailgemeine Zeitung, July 23, 1960.
12BothKhrushchev and Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
seem to agree with us that the fraction was within this range (see Vestnik statistiki [Statisti-
cal Bulletin], 1959, No. 11, p. 17, and Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies,
Hearings, 1960, p. 4).
StatisticalAbstract of the United Slates, 1958, p. 774.
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The converging lines of evidence now open to us support the view that
Soviet industrial production was about a fifth of U.S. production in 1955;
they do not support the view that it was a third. Why has the latter seemed
so plausible? The answer will become plain as we move to consider the
differing structures of industry in these two countries.
SOME STRUCTURAL COMPARISONS
We have already observed that percentage growth in output over
contemporaneous periods has been generally faster throughout the
different sectors of industry in the Soviet Union than in the United States,
while growth in labor productivity has been generally slower (see Table 65
and Chart 27). We may go on to note that the pattern of growth in labor
productivity among industrial groups does not seem to be related in the
two countries,14 while the pattern of growth in output does:those
industrial groups with relatively faster rates of growth in the one country
also tend to have relatively faster rates in the other.15
This similarity in growth pattern islargely superficial, however,
applying to broad categories of products but not to specific kinds of
products within each category.Soviet industrial development, as we
pointed out much earlier, has concentrated on quantitative growth of a
limited list of products; U.S. development, on proliferation of products
and qualitative improvements.For this reason, comparisons of per-
formance by a sample of industries can give a misleading impression of
comparative over-all growth, attention being focused on a sector of
industry much more important in the Soviet Union than in the United
States.
We may see this by examining comparative growth for such a list of
commodities (Tables 66 and 67 and Chart 28).Out of forty-seven
industries whose performance can be compared over the entire Soviet
period,16 thirty-nine showed a more rapid growth in output in the Soviet
14Therank correlation between the two sets of growth rates in labor productivity is
only 0.200 for the longer periods compared and 0.333 for the shorter ones, neither of
which is significant at the 10 per cent level. The correlation applies to the nine most
narrowly defined industrial groups in Table 65, the breakdown of machinery and allied
products ignored.
15Therank correlation between the two sets of growth rates in output is 0.717 for the
longer periods compared and 0.750 for the shorter ones. The first is significant at the
5 per cent level; the second, at the 2 per cent level.
16Thelist of industries—more accurately, commodities—is determined by the avail-
ability of data and the feasibility of identifying Soviet and U.S. counterparts.Since
Soviet industries are seldom carefully defined in original sources, choice of U.S. counter-
parts is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, though we have done our best to match what
seemed to be the most similar industries. One should also keep in mind that Soviet
(Note 16 continued on page 246)
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TABLE 65
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, OUTPUT PER
PERSON ENGAGED, AND OUTPUT PER CAPITA, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUP:
SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES, SELECTED CONCURRENT PERIODS
(per cent)
SovietUnion UnitedStates
1913—1955 1928—1955 1909—1953 1929—1953
OUTPUT
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 5.6 9.4 2.9 2.0
Fuel and electricity 7.4 10.0 5.5 4.1
Fuel 6.0 8.4 3.5 2.3
Electricity 10.8 16.6 9.8 6.1
Chemicals 6.9 9.4 6.6 5.1
Construction materials 3.4 5.9 2.3 2.2
Wood materials 3.1 5.4 1.6 1.9
Mineral materials 4.8 7.4 3.1 2.5
Machinery and allied products 8.6 13.0 5.5 4.3
Civilian machinery and equipment 8.8 12.5 6.1 4.6
Metal products n.a. n.a. 4.2 3.5
Food and allied products 2.3 4.2 3.2 3.2
Textiles and allied products 2.4 3.3 2.3 1.7
OUTPUT PER PERSON ENGAGED
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 3.2 3.9 1.2 0.4
Fueland electricity 3.2 4.3 3.3 4.3
Fuel 2.1 3.2 3.3 2.7
Electricity 4.3 4.4 5.5 5.5
Chemicals 1.4 2.2 3.3 2.7
Construction materials 0.5 0.1 2.0 1.6
Wood materials 0.7 0.4 1.5 1.7
Mineral materials 0.9 1.0 3.8 1.2
Machinery and allied products 3.1 4.5 2.0 1.1
Civilian machinery and equipment 3.4 4.9 2.1 1.2
Metal products n.a. n.a. 1.7 0.8
Food arid allied products 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.9
Textiles and allied products 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.1
OUTPUT PER HEAD OF POPULATION
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 4.7 8.3 1.6 0.8
Fueland electricity 6.4 8.9 4.1 2.9
5.1 7.3 2.2 1.1
Electricity 9.8 8.4 4.8
Chemicals 5.9 8.3 5.2 3.9
Constructionmaterials 2.5 4.9 1.0 1.0
Wood materials 2.2 4.4 0.3 0.7
Mineral materials 3.9 6.3 1.8 1.3
Machinery and allied products 11.9 4.1 3.1
Civilian machinery and equipment 7.8 11.4 4.7 3.4
Metal products n.a. n.a. 2.9 2.3
Food and allied products 1.4 3.2 1.9 2.0
Textiles and allied products 1.5 2.3 1.0 0.5
SOURCE: Tables A-24, A-37, and C-3.Notethat some industrial groups have a different coverage
from that in Tables 37 and 54. For the Soviet Union, figures on output reflect territorial gains. Average










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GROwTH RATES COMPARED FOR FIFTEEN NEW SOVIET INDUSTRIES:






U.S. Output, Soviet Union,United States,
1932—1955 1928—1955 1955"
Primary aluminum 45.1° n.a.
Automobiles 11.3° 2.9 1.4
Trucks and buses 12.2 3.2 27.0
Tractors 5.4 3.5 43.3
Tractor-drawn plows 2.3
Tractor-drawn cultivators 7.5 9•7t 595f
Grain combines 7.1 5.5 75.1
Diesel engines' 18.3 15.6" 37.7"
Electric 7.5 65.4"
Margarine 10.7 6.3 66.0
Cheese 9.1 4.0 17.3
Hosiery 5.2e 1.6t
Phonographs 12.4 4.9 27.1
Radios 23.2 6.2 24.3
Television sets 1111 1 6.4
Median 10.7 5.5 34.9
SOURCETables B-2 and E- 1.
ftbSee same footnotes, Table 66.








(Continuation of Note 16)
products are often of lower quality—less expensively made—than their U.S. counter-
parts, and their physical outputs are often relatively overstated. This is particularly true
for years after 1913 and, to a lesser degree, 1928, so that the bias mounts over time.
The upward bias in output or quality is likely to be most significant for the following
Soviet products:coal, mineral fertilizer, synthetic dyes, paper, lumber, window glass,
railroad freight and passenger cars, meat slaughtering, fish catch, canned food, boots and
shoes, woolen and worsted fabrics, and sewing machines. In the case of all fabrics, U.S.
output in linear measure has been adjusted upward to compensate for the narrower
width of Soviet fabrics. Two other adjustments could have been made, but the possi-
bility was not discovered until analysis had gone too far to turn back. One applies to
window glass; American output should be adjusted upward by at least 35 per cent to
compensate for the lesser thickness of the Soviet product. The other applies to electric
power: Soviet output should be adjusted downward to exclude consumption by power
stations, which is not counted in American output. The fraction of output represented
by such consumption has risen from around 2 per cent in 1913 to around 6 per cent in
recent years (see Promythiennosi' SSSR [Industry of the USSR], Moscow, 1957, p. 21).
Coverage of U.S. output data is described briefly in Appendix E. Chart A-2 contains
graphs of Soviet and U.S. output for the sample of forty-seven industries.
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STA TES
Frequency Distributions of Growth Rates for Forty-Seven Industries:
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Source: Table 66.
average annuol growth rote (per cent)
Union than in the United States over 1913—1955, and forty-two showed
over 1928—1955. The median
growth rate over 1913—1955 was 5.0 per cent for the Soviet Union
compared with 2.0 per cent for the United States;over 1928—1955,
7.7 per cent compared with 2.5 per cent. A similar picture is revealed for












a more rapid growth average annualINDUSTRIAL GROWTH:
during the Plan period:Soviet output grew faster percentagewise in
twelve of these industries, and the Soviet median average annual growth
rate was 10.7 per cent compared. with the U.S. median of 5.5 per cent.
From Table 68 we see that the median growth rate for the forty-seven
industries is higher than the weighted average rate given by production
indexes in the case of the Soviet Union, but lower in the case of the
United States. Hence inferences about comparative growth made from
TABLE 68
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL. OUTPUT CALCULATED IN DIFFERENT






All products 4.4 3.8 6.9 3.8
All civilian products 4.3 6.6
Industrial materials 4.0 3.3 6.2 3.3
Median growth rate for 47 industricsb 5.0 2.0 7.7 2.5
SOURCE: Tables 25, 35, 62, and A-26. Average annual growth rates calculated from
data for terminal years by the compound interest formula.
aIncludesgains from territorial expansion.
b For seventy industries, the median Soviet growth rates are 5.3 per cent for 19 13—1955
and 8.0 per cent for 1928—1955 (see Table A-i).
this sample of counterpart industries contain a substantial bias in favor of
the Soviet Union. The same point is illustrated somewhat differently
by the fact that the ratio of Soviet to U.S. industrial output derived from
the sample of industries consistently overstates the ratio derived directly
for all industry, and the overstatement increases markedly between 1913
and 1955 (see Table 69). This follows from the fact that the fraction of
industrial value added accounted for by this sample of industries has
always been higher, over the period in question, in the Soviet Union
than in the United States and has declined relatively much more sharply
in the latter than in the former (see Table 70).
It is now easy to understand how the ratio of Soviet to U.S. industrial
output for recent years could be significantly overestimated: the kinds
of products for which direct comparisons can be made constitute a much
smaller portion of industry in the United States than in the Soviet Union.
Thus, the 1955 Soviet value added (in of forty-five industries'7
17 Two of the sample of forty-seven, industries (synthetic dyes and sausages) are not
included here because of difficulties in estimating value added for all years.
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TABLE 69
COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF VALUE ADDED FOR ALL INDUSTRY AND A SAMPLE OF FORTY-FIVE


























Median physicaloutput ratio, 47 industries 15.6 13.0 44.4
SOURCE: Tables 63, A-26, and B-2.
aThefractions for 1913 projected by the ratio of Soviet to U.S. production indexes for
all products (Table 61) give the following (in per Cent):
1928 1955
Dollar prices 8.3 18.2
Ruble prices 6.3 13.9
b For forty-seven industries, the median Soviet lag in output behind the United States
was thirty-five years in 1955 (see Table 79). Hence U.S. output of these industries in
1920 was about equal to Soviet output in 1955. From a production index for a comparable
set of products (Moore's index for industrial materials as given in R. V. Greenslade and
P. A. Wallace, "Industrial Growth in the Soviet Union: Comment," American Economic
Review, September 1959, p. 689), we find that 1955 Soviet output (that is, 1920 U.s.
output) was about 41 per cent of 1955 U.S. output, a figure identical with the one calcu-
lated directly.
TABLE 70
VALUE ADDED FOR A SAMPLE OF FORTY-FIVE INDUSTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VALUE




Soviet Union 67.1 63.1 50.3
United States 45.1 37.0 27.6
Indirect calculationb
Soviet Union 67.1 67.1 55.3
United States 45.1 39.6C 27.9
a FromTables 63 and A-26. Soviet values in rubles, U.S. in dollars.
b Fraction for 1913 projected by ratio of production index for industrial materials
(with coverage comparable to the forty-five industries considered here) to production
index for all products. Indexes for all products from Table 61; Soviet index for industrial




SOVIET AND U.S. VALUE ADDED FOR FORTY-FIVE INDUSTRIES COMPARED WITH
U.S. VALUE ADDED FOR ALL INDUSTRIES, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUP, 1955
United States
Soviet Union,
b Industriesb 45 Industries AllIndustriesa
MILLION 1954 DOLLARS
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 13,972 7,668 3,253
Fuel and electricity 17,864 15,755 4,267
Chemicals 13,084 5,247 828
Construction materials 14,958 3,820 2,839
Machinery and allied productsc 53,131 333 492
Food and allied products 15,172 5,800 3,775
Textiles and allied products 14,889 2,901 1,473
Printing and publishing 6,628
Total 149,698 41,524 16,928
PER CENT OF U.S. TOTAL
Ferrous and nonferrous metals 9.3 5.1 2.2
Fuel and electricity 11.9 10,5 2.9
Chemicals 8.7 3.5 0.6
Construction materials 10.0 2.6 1.9
Machinery and allied productsc 35.5 0.2 0.3
Food and allied products 10.1 3.9 2.5
Textiles and allied products 9.9 1.9 1.0
Printing and publishing 4.4
Total 100.0 27.7 11.3
a 1954census value added for each group projected to 1955 by Federal Reserve Board production
index as given in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958, pp. 718 and 775. Indexes for subgroups
(for coverage of industrial groups as used here, see Table A-35) combined by 1957 weight factors as
given in Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1959, p. 1467. Summed value added differs slightly from the
figure $150,682 million derived from aggregate value added and production index (see Tables A-42
and 63).
b From Table A-26.
CIncludesconsumer durables.
was 41 per cent of the U.S. value added of the same industries (see Table
69), but only 11 per cent of the U.S. value added of all industry (see Table
71). In the case of the Soviet Union, those forty-five industries accounted
for around half the value added of all industry; in the case of the United
States, for only around a quarter. If we then suppose that Soviet produc-
tion had come to about 40 per cent of the U.S. level in all other Soviet
industries, just as it did in the sample of forty-five industries, then those
other industries would have accounted for an additional 11 or 12 per cent
of the value added of all U.S. industry. Value added in Soviet industry
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would then have been about 23 per cent of the U.S. level, or the figure we
derived earlier by direct calculation.'8
Industry is simply more austere in the Soviet Union than in the United
States. Many important products now produced in the United States
are produced in negligible or relatively small amounts in the Soviet Union.
For example,apparel,furniture,paper products, newspapers and
periodicals, electronic equipment and parts, and motor vehicles and parts
together accounted for more than 17 per cent of U.S. industrial value
added in 1954. From casual inspection of the 1954 Census of Manu-
factures, one can draw up a long list of other products also produced in
relatively small volume in the Soviet Union around 1955 but accounting
for an additional 13 per cent of U.S. industrial value added.'9
18Thesesame considerations also help to explain why Soviet labor productivity has
been overestimated relative to the United States.For example, Walter Galenson
estimates that the Soviet output per wage earner immediately before the war was around
40 per cent of the U.S. level (Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry, New York,
1955, p. 240), a figure more than double our estimate for 1955. If we assume that Galen-
son's calculations are accurate, the group of industries from which he derives this estimate
could not have been equally representative of labor productivity in the two economies.
To see this, let us suppose that, in all counterpart industries, Soviet productivity had been
40 per cent of the U.S. level. Then, since the industrial labor forces were of roughly the
same size, Soviet production would also have been 40 per cent of the U.S. level. But if
our estimates of relative output in 1928 and growth in the two industrial economies in
the interwar period are anywhere near correct, Soviet production was less than 25 per
cent of the U.S. level just before World War II.
Put another way, the industries included in this comparison then accounted for about
a fifth of industrial employment and value added in both the Soviet Union and the
United States. Hence U.S. production of this group of products was almost as large as
total Soviet industrial production, although only a fifth as many employees were required
to produce it.
It is interesting to note that a Soviet economist has recently claimed that Soviet labor
productivity was 45 to 49 per cent of the U.S. level in 1954 (A. Kats, "Comparison of
Labor Productivity in the Industry of the USSR and the Chief Capitalist Countries,"
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XI, 32, p. 5; original text in Sotsialisticheskii trud, 1959,
No: 1, pp. 42—55). This figure is hardly consistent with Galenson's from the Soviet point
of view, if we were to grant their persistent claims that labor productivity is growing
much faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States.Projecting Kats' figure
backward to 1937 by the ratio of the official Soviet index of labor productivity (Promyshlen-
nost', 1957, P. 25) to our U.S. index based on persons engaged (Table A-36), we would
find the fraction to be about 30 per cent in 1937.
19Thelist contains the following products: dehydrated fruits and vegetables; ,packaged
seafood; frozen fruits and vegetables; biscuits and crackers; chewing gum; flavoring;
miscellaneous food preparations, n.e.c.;cigars;full-fashioned hosiery;hard-surface
floor coverings; coated fabric; miliwork; synthetic fibers; drugs and medicines; clean-
ing and polishing preparations (except soap);paints, varnishes, and allied products;
toilet preparations;insecticides and fungicides;chemical products, n.e.c.;rubber
industries, n.e.c.;leather dress gloves; luggage; handbags and purses; small leather
goods; hardware, n.e.c.; plumbing fixtures and fittings;heating and cooking equip-
ment; office and store machines; domestic laundry equipment; laundry and dry clean-
ing machines; vacuum cleaners; refrigeration machinery; measuring and dispensing
pumps; service and household machines, n.e.c.; electrical appliances; engine electrical
equipment;storage batteries, primary batteries;X-ray and therapeutic apparatus;
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Some, though far from all, differences in structural developments are
revealed in the industrial distributions of employment over the years
(see Table 72).In both countries, the share of employment in the so-
called heavy industries has been increasing at the expense of the share in
food processing and textiles and apparel. Machinery and allied products
have rather consistently accounted for a larger share in the United States
than in the Soviet Union, though some of the discrepancy is made up by
the differing importance of consumer goods:in the mid-1950's, they
represented about 7 per cent of industrial employment in the United
States and about 3 per cent in the Soviet Union.2° At the same time, the
following industrial groups accounted for a larger fraction of employment
in Soviet than in U.S. industry: fuel, wood construction materials, mineral
construction materials, food and allied products, and textiles and allied
products. The following accounted for a smaller fraction: ferrous and
nonferrous metals,electricity,chemicals, and machinery and allied
products. In general the 1955 Soviet distribution of employment seems
to resemble the U.S. distribution more closely for the years 1909 and 1919
than for any other years.
The data compiled here provide some evidence that can shed light on
the effects of industrial structure on production indexes for the two
countries.It will be recalled from the first section of Chapter 5 that the
movements of a production index depend in part on the path of expansion
followed by an economy: other relevant things the same, the larger the
share of production accounted for by commodities whose relative unit
costs are declining over time, the higher is the growth that will be
measured by a production index.If we accept unit physical labor cost
(the inverse of labor productivity) as an ordinal measure of total unit cost,
we may array industries in each country according to reduction in unit
cost:the larger the growth in labor productivity, the greater is the
reduction in unit cost. Those industries with greater than average growth
in productivity may then be taken as having declining relative unit costs,
electrical products, n.e.c.; truck trailers; auto trailers; medical equipment and supplies;
photographic equipment; jewelry and silverware;musical instruments ançl parts;
toys and sporting goods; office supplies; costume jewelry and notions; plastic products,
n.e.c.; brooms and brushes; cork products; fireworks and pyrotechnics; jewelry and
instrument cases;lamp shades; miscellaneous manufactured products, n.e.c. (except
ordnance).
Total industrial value added was taken as $134.2 billion for 1954 (see Table A-42).
All other values were taken from the 1954 census of manufactures.
20TheU.S. figure is based on 1957 weights for the Federal Reserve Board index
(FederalReserve Bulletin, December 1959,p.1467)covering automotive products,
appliances, television and radio sets, and miscellaneous home goods. The Soviet estimate



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and the volume of resources devoted to them—measured by employ-
ment—may be determined.2'
Out of the nine industrial groups into which we have divided all
industry (the breakdown of machinery and allied products is, of necessity,
ignored), four had greater than average growth in labor productivity
over 1913—1955 in the Soviet Union and over 1909—1953 in the United
States (compare Tables 62 and 65). They were not the same industrial
groups in the two cases, though the same in number. These industrial
groups accounted for the following fractions of persons engaged:
United States Soviet Union




1929 21.5 1928 26.4
1937 20.4 1937 41.6
1948 19.3 1950 46.0
1953 17.6 1955 47.0
It therefore appears that the share of employment for industrial groups
with greater than average growth in labor productivity has been larger
in the Soviet Union than in the United States, no matter what benchmark
years are compared.
Similar results obtain for the Soviet period 1928—1955 and the U.S.
counterpart 1929—1953. For the Soviet Union,. there were five industrial
groups with greater than average growth in labor productivity; for the
United States, there were three groups. These industries accounted for
the following fractions of persons engaged:
United States Soviet Union
YearPer Cent YearPer Cent
1929 16.9 1928 28.3
1937 16.2 1937 44.7
1948 14.8 1950 48.9
1953 13.4 1955 50.4
21Thearrays with cumulated percentages of employment are given in Tables A-39
and A-40.It clearly would have been preferable to use value added instead of employ-
ment, but the needed Soviet data do not exist. As may be seen from the data in the cited
tables, for industries with the most rapid growth in labor productivity, the percentage
share of value added tends to be higher than the percentage share of employment.
Moreover, the relevant share of employment in the case of the United States—for which
this can be studied—has a growing downward bias over time, apparently because indus-
tries with the most rapid growth in productivity experience a more rapid percentage
decline in the ratio of unit physical labor cost to total unit cost than other industries do.
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We may therefore conclude that industrial groups with relatively
declining unit costs over time have accounted for a larger fraction of
industrial resources in the Soviet Union than in the United States. On
this score, conventional production indexes overstate industrial growth
in the Soviet Union relative to the United States. That is to say, if the
Soviet path of expansion had more closely paralleled the U.S. path in
this respect, the measured growth of Soviet industry would probably have
been lower than it is.
To bring the discussion of contemporary structure to a close, we may
make a few observations about comparative military production. Some
estimates for recent years are brought together in Table 73 covering
TABLE73
OUTPUTOF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY PRODUCTS: UNITED
STATES AND SOVIET UNION, 1954 AND 1955







VALUE OF MILITARY PRODUCTS AS PERCENTAGE







SOVIET VALUE OF MILITARY PRODUCTS AS
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. VALUE
Ruble prices 60%
Dollar prices 72%
SOURCE: Tables A-b, A-31, and A-44.
a.Excludesatomic energy. However, Soviet value is probably substantially overstated
(see annex to technical note 4 of Appendix A). Value applies to items delivered to
military authorities and hence excludes double counting. Including atomic energy, the
U.S. value is $13.7 billion or 82.2 billion rubles.
b Value in rubles divided by ruble-dollar price ratio for machinery (5.0) based on
Soviet output weights (see Table A-3l).
Value in dollars times ruble-dollar price ratio for machinery (6.0) based on U.S.
output weights (see Table A-3l).
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conventional military products—that is,excluding atomic energy.22
In using these figures, it should be borne in mind that the Soviet magni-
tudes may be substantially overstated, in view of some recent evidence
summarized in the annex to technical note 4 of Appendix A.Military
production is without doubt relatively much more important in Soviet
industry than in U.S. industry, the value of military products constituting
more than a quarter of industrial value added in the former and less than
a tenth in the latter, according to our estimates (all values expressed in
dollars).23 The 1955 Soviet value of military products, as we estimate it,
was almost equal to three-quarters of the 1954 U.S. value, both again
expressed in dollars.24 Hence Soviet production relative to the United
States in this area far exceeds the average for all industry, a conclusion that
holds true for any likely error in the Soviet magnitudes.
Comparable Growth
Once industrialization has gotten under way in a country, the pace of
industrial growth at any moment would seem to depend on the resource
potential, the state of industrial arts, the prevailing level of industrial
output (i.e., the extent to which potential is being utilized), and that
catchall, the economic system.The process of economic growth is
mysteriously complex and cannot be summarized in these brief comments,
but this is not the place to discuss the manifold preconditions and environ-
mental factors essential for sustained economic growth. We take it for
granted that industrialization and the accompanying process of growth
are a fact in the Soviet Union, just as they were, more incipiently, in
Tsarist Russia. We are therefore concerned here only with the more
fundamental conditioning factors making that growth faster or slower
than it would otherwise be. As far as such things can be quantified, the
22Expenditureson the atomic energy program in the United States amounted to
$1,895 million in 1954 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1958, p. 242), or 16 per
cent of the value of conventional military products.
23Rublemeasures are not very meaningful for such comparisons because of the arbi-
trarily low prices attached to military products in the Soviet Union. Note that the value of
military products, not the value added by industries processing materials into military
products, is being compared with the value added for all industry. Hence all stages of
industrial processing of military products are being taken into account.
24Ifthe overstatement in our estimate of Soviet production of conventional military
products is taken to be large enough to offset the missing item of atomic energy, Soviet
production is only 62 per cent of the U.S. level including atomic energy (see Table 73,
note a).
It is interesting that military production multiplied more than four times in the Soviet
Union over 1947-4955 by our estimate (see Table A-b) and over five times in the
United States over 1947—1957 (see my "Reply," American Economic Review, September
1959, p. 698). The U.S. growth probably started from a lower level relative to the
wartime peak, however.
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larger the resource potential, the more advanced the technology, and the
smaller the output, the more rapid the growth in output will be, given the
economic system. None of these factors can be clearly defined, but they
can all be represented by certain more or less adequate indicators. Our
immediate problem is to find indicators that will allow us to select periods
in Soviet and American industrial history that are comparable except
with respect to economic system.
What is a good indicator of resource potential? If we may judge from
the general practice of comparing economies in per capita terms, it would
seem that population is typically used to indicate resource potential.
But it is often a poor indicator since populations grow in response to
economic development and differently in different economies. Moreover
and more importantly, population can grow from immigration as well as
from natural increase. As a concrete example for the problem at hand,
in the United States the expanding industrial labor force in the latter
partof the nineteenth century was recruited in important measure from the
economically underutilized population in other countries, including
Russia.25 The expansion in the Soviet Union during the twentieth
century came, on the other hand, from the large internal pooi of under-
utilized population. Hence, compared with the Soviet Union, population
understates the resource potential of the nineteenth century United States.
The resource potential of an economy is more adequately described by
the volume of all resources at its disposal, including climate and terrain.
If this can be precisely and accurately measured, it remains to be done.
In the meantime, we are perhaps justified in making the impressionistic
judgment that the Soviet Union and the United States have roughly
similar resource potentials. Both countries are rich in natural resources,
though the specific endowments obviously differ. Against the larger size
of the Soviet Union must be offset the substantial climatic and topo-
graphical disadvantages—at least in the present state of civilization.
Although in total area the Soviet Union is about two and a half times as
large as the United States, in inhabitable area it is only about as large.
Other relevant things the same—like tastes, technology, population,
economic system, and so on—we suppose that the two countries would be
able to support roughly equivalent levels of industrial productioii on the
basis of resource endowments.
This leads us to suppose further that, if the state of industrial arts and
25Foreign-bornpersons accounted for about 18 per cent of the net increase in total
gainfully occupied population or labor force over 1870—1900 (see Simon Kuznets and
Ernest Rubiri, Immigration and the Foreign Born, NBER Occasional Paper 46, New York,
1954, p. 46).
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the aggregate levels of industrial output were the same in the two
countries, differences in the rate of growth of industrial output should be
attributable to differences in economic systems. Unfortunately, we cannot
standardize both the level of output and the state of technology simul-
taneously in the two countries. To find dates at which output was
roughly equivalent, one must go back a number of years in American
history. Thus, as we shall see, the level of Russian output in 1913 within
the interwar Soviet territory was reached in the United States around
1875.But the state of industrial arts—at least the available body of
technology—was less advanced in the United States in 1875 than in the
Russia of 1913: the same body of technical knowledge, if not skills, has
been available to the two countries at roughly the same dates in history.
Therefore, when we standardize the level of output from which growth
starts—as we are about to do—any difference that we observe between
growth rates in the two countries must be attributed to differences in both
technology and economic system. While the effects of each cannot be
fully isolated, we can at least say in whose favor the difference in techno-
logies operates and thereby narrow the range of ignorance.
These remarks make the issues seem simpler than they are, because they
presuppose that the periods to be compared represent normal times.
This is, of course, not so for the Soviet Union, unless we view periodic,
disasters as a part of normal times there. Since the founding of the Soviet
Union, no span of years longer than a decade has been free from major
disturbances or recoveries from them. As we have emphasized before, we
cannot possibly know which period has had a growth rate similar to what
would be expected from a long stretch of normal years, and we must
therefore choose several Soviet periods, representing differing circum-
stances, in making comparisons with American industrial growth.
Subject to the outlined qualifications, a Soviet period would have as its
counterpart in the United States a period whose terminal years had the
same total industrial output, unadjusted for differences in population, as
obtained in the Soviet Union in 1913 and 1955, or whatever years we
might wish to choose.If industrial output is measured by weighted
aggregates, the Soviet periods 1913—1955 and 1928—1955 are "comparable"
with the American period 1875—1914; that is, for both countries industrial
output started and ended at roughly the same levels within these periods,
insofar as we are justified in making such broad intertemporal and
international comparisons.26If output is measured by the median
26TheAmerican dates are derived as follows.Soviet industrial output, calculated in
dollar values, was 13.9 per cent of the American level in 1913.Looking back into
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performance of a group of individual industries, the Soviet periods are
comparable to the American period 1885—1920 (see the annex to this
chapter). The dating of these periods implies that it took thirty-five to
forty years in the United States to register the same growth as was
accomplished over forty-two years in the Soviet Union—or, if the
depressed pre-Plan years are ignored, over twenty-seven years.
We must remind ourselves that these periods are comparable only with
respect to two of the factors influencing rate of growth: resource potential
and prevailing level of industrial output. They are not comparable with
respect to the state of the industrial arts. The advantage—a substantial
one—is in favor of the Soviet Union, since it has had the technology of the
twentieth century at its disposal in working out its industrialization.
One can only dream about what difference it would have made to U.S.
industrial growth in the nineteenth century if it had proceeded under
twentieth century technology.
The choice of comparable stages of development in the industries of
the Soviet Union and the United States is, therefore, unavoidably hazy
and arbitrary to some degree. We shall summarize here the records of
industrial growth in the Soviet Union and the United States over periods
of equal length that are comparable in the sense that the beginning year in
each case represents roughly the same level of output in the two countries.
We start with the longest period studied for the Soviet Union, 1913—
1955. The growth rate over this period—4.l per cent a year, excluding
gains from territorial expansion—is slower than the rate for a comparable
U.S. period:5.1 per cent a year over 1875—1917 or 4.3 per cent over
1885—1927 (see Table 74). On a per capita basis, the Soviet growth rate
is higher: 3.5 per cent a year compared with 3.0 per cent. But we must
recall the misleading nature of comparisons of per capita rates, in view
of the fact that population growth overstates growth in resource
potential in the United States compared with the Soviet Union.27
American industrial history and smoothing out the cyclical fluctuations in our U.S.
production index by means of a nine-year moving average, we find that output in 1875
was also around 14 per cent of the level of 1913. A similar procedure gives the American
date 1914 as roughly equivalent, in level of output, to the Soviet date 1955.
27Ifpopulation were taken as a guide to industrial potential, we might identify as
comparable "stages of development" those periods in which industrial output per head
of population was the same in both countries.This procedure is not only difficult to
justify for the reasons just stated, but it is also impossible to apply. The Soviet level of
industrial output per capita in 1955 corresponds roughly with the American level in
1887; the Soviet level in 1913 was lower than the American level in 1860, the earliest
year for which aggregate industrial output can be calculated. Similar results are found
by taking the median dates at which per capita output of a group of industries was the
same in both countries.
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TABLE 74
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND OUTPUT PER CAPITA:












































SOURCE: Table 61. Average aiinual growth rates calculated from data for terminal
years by the compound interest formula. For the U.S. periods comparable with 1913—1955
and 1928—1955, a centered nine-year moving average is used for each terminal year.
aPeriodsare comparable for growth in output only, not output per capita. See text.
bExcludesterritorial gains.
For lack of sufficientdata, we cannot compare growth inlabor
productivity.
If we turn to the Plan period, 1928—1955, we observe that the Soviet
growth rate, again adjusted to exclude territorial gains, is higher than for
a comparable U.S. period: 6.5 per cent a year compared with 5.5 per
cent over 1875—1 902 and 4.8 per cent over 1885—1912. The difference in
per capita rates is even larger in favor of the Soviet Union. We therefore
do not observe comparable U.S. periods, in the limited sense we are using,
in which the speed of industrial growth has matched that during the Plan
period in the Soviet Union.
For shorter spurts of growth, the Soviet performance also seems to have
the edge: the Soviet growth rate over 1928—1940 exceeds the U.S. rates
over 1875—1887 and 1885—1897 by a substantial margin. In a sense, this
period of Soviet growth may be likened to the twelve years in the United
States following the Great Depression; in both cases, growth was beginning
again after a decade of depression and stagnation. The Soviet rate is
faster in this comparison as well:8.9 per cent a year compared with
6.5 per cent.
To illustrate a point, we also include a comparison with the Soviet
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growth rate of 9.6 per cent a year over 1950—1955.If the U.S. period
1909—19 14 is chosen for comparison, the U.S. counterpart is 3.2 per cent;
if, however, the dates are moved one year back to cover 1908—1913, the
counterpart is 8.0 per cent. The point of this is that it proves nothing.
The experience of a five-year period, plucked from history, carries no
permanent message with it.
A similar picture emerges in comparing growth rates for a group of
individual industries. One way of doing this is to proceed industry by
industry, studying in each case what has happened to the Soviet lag
behind U.S. output as of specific dates for Soviet output. For example,
the Soviet output of steel ingots in 1913 had been reached in the United
States around 1892; the Soviet output in 1955, around 1926. Hence the
Soviet lag was twenty-one years in 1913 and twenty-nine years in 1955.
Since the lag increased over this period, it follows that, starting from the
same level, U.S. output of steel ingots grew faster, both absolutely and
relatively, than Soviet output. Put another way, the same absolute and
percentage growth occurred in the United States in thirty-five years as
occurred in the Soviet Union in forty-two.
We have studied the behavior of Soviet lags for forty-seven counterpart
industries as of a number of benchmark years, and the details are given
in the annex to this chapter. The results may be summarized in the form
of movements in median lags—that is, those lags exceeded by half the
industries and fallen short of by the other half. The median number of






We observe that, on the average, Soviet output of this group of industries
grew more slowly over 1913—1955, but more rapidly over 1928—1955, than
U.S. output over comparable periods. Relative to comparable periods in
the United States, Soviet growth was slower over 1913—1928, faster over
1928—1937, slower again over 1937—1950, and faster over 1950—1955.
In these comparisons, territorial gains are counted as part of Soviet
growth, and in this respect the Soviet Union is favored.
It will be noticed that the Soviet and U.S. periods compared for any
one product may differ considerably in length, since what is being com-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES FOR THIRTEEN NEw SOVIET INDUSTRIES:
SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES, COMPARABLE PERIODS
(per cent)
Average Annual Growth Rate Comparable
Period of Growth,
United Statese Soviet UnionaUnited Statesb
Primary aluminum 21.3 1905—1912
Automobiles 1 29.4 1903—1925
Trucks and buses 12.2 15.6 1914—1937
Tractors 5.4 6.0 1917—1940
Tractor-drawn plows 2.3 7.3 1923—1946
Tractor-drawn cultivators 7.5 9.1 1929—1955
Grain combines 7.1 10.0 1926—1949
Diesel engines 18.3 18.6 1922—1945
Electric motors 7.5 3.9 1917—1940
Margarine 10.7 5.1 1906—1929
Hosiery 5,2e 4.9 1890—1912
Radio receiving sets 23.2 29.6 192 1—1944
Television sets lilt 278 1946—1951
Median 10.7 10.0
SOURCE: Appendixes B and E. Average annual growth rate calculated from output in
terminal years by the compound interest formula.
a 1932—1955, except as noted below.
b Growth rates were in general calculated from actual oucput in beginning year and
moving average in ending year. Exceptions are as follows: tractor-drawn plows, tractor-
drawn cultivators, and margarine—moving average in beginning year; diesel engines,
electric motors, hosiery, and television sets—actual output in ending year. Wherever
data were missing for the years used, they were logarithmically interpolated or extrapo-
lated graphically.
A comparable period is taken as twenty-three years beginning with the year in which
the level of output first became approximately equal to the Soviet output in 1932, except
as noted below.
d 1933—1940. Output in 1932 was at an experimental level.
e 1933—1955.
1950—1955.
growth.Similarly, the U.S. periods comparable with any given Soviet
period (as 19 13—1955) may vary from one industry to another, since the
Soviet pattern of output at any particular time has never been precisely
duplicated in the United States.
Another method that can be used is to compare growth rates for a
group of industries over periods of equal length in the two countries
(see Tables 75 through 77 and Chart 29).28 Here we may proceed as in
28Thesample of industries compared is the same for both countries in the tables and
the upper panel of the chart, but different in the lower panel.In the latter case, the
Soviet sample of seventy industries is taken from Table 8; the U.S. sample of sixty-
eight industries from A. F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870, New
York, NBER, 1934, pp. 309—312, industries numbered 21—91 except 29, 60, and 83.
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CHART29
Frequency Distributions of Growth Rates for Samples of Individual
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Source: Tables 8 and 75: A. F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870, New York, NBER
1934, pp. 309 if.See Footnote 28 oF this chapter.
thestudy of lags, by choosing a comparable U.S. period for each industry
separately, that period being one beginning with a year in which U.S.
output was at about the same level as for the initial year of the Soviet
period and extending over the same number of years as the Soviet period.
Average annual growth rates are calculated from output in terminal years by the com-
pound interest formula. For six U.S. industries, growth covers 1885—1920.
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AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OVER COMPARABLE PERIODS
CALCULATED IN DIFFERENT WAYS: SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES
(per cent)
Soviet United Soviet United
Union, States, Union, States,
1913—Comparable 1928— Comparable
1955 Period 1955 Period
Production index, all productsa 4.1 5.1 6.5 5.5
Median of growth rates
41 industriesb 5.4 5.3 8.2 7.5
37 industries° 5.0 5.8 7.2 7.5
Different samples of industries
for each 5.3 5.2
a FromTable 74, U.S. periods 1875—1917 and 1875—1902.Soviet output excludes
territorial gains.
b From Table 75. Comparable period applies to each industry separately and hence
varies among industries. Soviet output includes territorial gains.
CFromTable 75, U.S. periods 1880—1920 and 1880—1905.Soviet output includes
territorial gains.
d From Chart 29, U.S. period 1880—1920. Covers seventy Soviet and sixty-eight U.S.
industries. Soviet output includes territorial gains.
Or, for any given Soviet period, we may choose a standard U.S. period
for all industries as a basis of comparison. We have done both, in the
latter case using the U.S. periods 1880—1920 and 1880—1905 to compare
with the Soviet periods 1913—1955 and 1928—1955. In both procedures,
Soviet growth, when proper allowance is made for eliminating territorial
gains, comes out slower over 1913—1955 than over comparable U.S.
periods, but faster over 1928—1955, 1928—1937, and 1950—1955.It is
interesting that, for a group of relatively new Soviet industries, Soviet and
U.S. growth have been similar over comparable periods (see Table 76).
Concluding Remarks
What can be said about Soviet industrial achievements? In the first
place, they have been impressive. In terms of its ability to generate sheer
growth in industrial output—the questions of how much the growth has
cost, what product mix has evolved, and how the products have been put
to use being left aside—the Soviet system of centralized direction has
proved itself to be more or less the peer of the market economy, as
exemplified by the United States. This much seems beyond dispute even
in the face of the questionable reliability of Soviet statistics.
Of course, the character of Soviet industrial growth has not been the
same as in Western economies. Enhancement of state power hasbeen
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the primary objective, the consumer being treated essentially as a residual
claimant. Investment goods and munitions have been emphasized at the
expense of consumer goods; and other important sectors of the economy—
agriculture, construction, and consumer services—have been relatively
neglected to help foster industrial expansion. At times, large groups of the
population have been sacrificed or made to work in forced labor to promote
internal economic policies.Leisure has shown little tendency to grow.
This is all well known but deserves repetition to place Soviet industrial
achievements in perspective. The character of industrial growth being so
different from that in the West, there is a sense in which the two sets of
achievements cannot be compared at all.
The last point should be underlined: the pattern of industrial growth
observed in the Soviet Union would never be duplicated by a market
economy. Sovereign consumers would not choose the paths of growth
chosen by Soviet rulers. This raises the awkward question of whether a
highly generalized measure of growth has much meaning even as an
indicator of expansion in productive capacity available for whatever use
it may be put to.As we demonstrated at the beginning of Chapter 5,
measures of economic growth, as they are conventionally made in the
form of index numbers, depend in fact on the path of growth—on the
uses to which productive capacity is put. And, as noted in this chapter,
the Soviet path of growth has favored measured growth relative to the
United States.If we bowed to the stern dictates of logic, we would be
able to compare Soviet and U.S. industrial growth only if both economies
served either consumer welfare or state power. But that is ruled out by
the very difference in social order whose influence on growth we wish to
assess. This dilemma can be mastered only by admitting it—by avoiding
the delusion that there is some single-dimensioned, neutral measure of
growth, equally meaningful for all types of economies.
The question of economic waste is a related matter and equally difficult
to treat.Growth is measured in terms of things "produced," not in
terms of things usefully consumed. In a market economy, the two magni-
tudes are similar but not at all identical:mistakes are made by both
entrepreneurs and consumers,rendering some productiveactivity
worthless. The same kinds of mistakes are made in the Soviet Union,
probably on a larger scale since centralized planning is involved.In
addition, because of the weak position of most buyers, substandard goods
often pass for standard quality, goods are damaged and spoiled in transit
beyond normal experience in a market economy, and so on. Although
Soviet industry does not experience business cycles as they are known in
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market economies, it is periodically faced with the need to re-allocate
resources on a large scale, and the accompanying waste that would appear
in the form of temporarily unemployed resources in a market economy
will appear, at least in part, in the form of unwanted accumulation of
inventories.It is difficult enough to say something sensible about which
type of economy has the more waste inherent in it.It is even more
difficult to say what all this has to do with problems of measuring growth.
Unless wastage has, in some meaningful sense, been growing at different
rates in American and Soviet industry, there is nothing to be gained by
taking account of this factor as far as comparing growth of industrial
output is concerned.
These qualifications serve as warnings against careless comparisons of
either the relative size or the relative growth of Soviet and U.S. industry.
In particular, broad aggregative measures of industrial output tell us
nothing about capacities for specific tasks, such as waging war or promoting
consumer welfare. While Soviet industrial output in 1955 may have been,
in the aggregate, about a fifth of the American level, production directly
available for military purposes was a much larger fraction (almost three-
quarters), and production available for consumers a much smaller one.
Similarly, growth in the two areas has differed in the same way in the two
countries.
It remains to be noted once again that the quantitative achievements
of Soviet industry have not been understated by Soviet authorities. The
official Soviet index of industrial production embodies a myth that should
be dispelled from the popular mind. On this matter, Western scholars
speak as one, though they may disagree as to the gravity of the myth.
The official Soviet index shows industrial output as multiplying twenty-
seven times between 1913 and 1955; the indexes presented here, based on
official Soviet data on physical output and unit values and constructed
according to conventional Western methods, show output as multiplying
five to six times.If our indexes are taken as reasonably accurate, the
official index contains a four- to fivefold exaggeration of growth over this
period.
Bearing all these qualifications in mind, what may we conclude about
the industrial performance of the Soviet Union relative to the United
States? First, in level of output, Soviet industry was in 1955 roughly four
decades behind the United States; in level of output per head of popula-
tion, almost seven decades. Second, Soviet growth in output has been
somewhat slower over the entire Soviet period, at least through 1955,
than U.S. growth over the four decades bracketing the turn of this
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century, periods that are comparable in the sense that output started at
roughly the same level in both cases; on the other hand, Soviet growth in
output per head of population has been faster, because of fundamentally
different relations in the two countries between population growth and
economic growth. Third, Soviet growth in output, both total and per
capita, has been faster over the Plan years than U.S. growth over a
comparable period.In this and the preceding comparisons, the Soviet
Union is favored in that it has had a more advanced technology at its
disposal.Fifth,Soviet percentage growth—and Russian percentage
growth over the last half century of Tsarist rule—has been faster over
concurrent periods than U.S. percentage growth in the cases of total and
per capita output, but slower—at least in the Soviet instance—in the case
of output per unit of labor. At the same time, absolute growth has been
significantly smaller—the gap in absolute industrial production between
the two countries has grown steadily. Sixth and finally, industrial output
in both countries has experienced a retardation in measured percentage
growth between long periods on either side of the second decade of this
century.Soviet growth has also retarded within the Soviet and Plan
periods, but U.S. growth apparently has not.
Our eyes wander irresistibly toward the future, and we must wonder
whether and in what respects Soviet industry might outdistance the
industrial sectors of the more dynamic Western economies, such as the
United States. Nobody can see a certain answer to that question;it
depends on too many imponderables. Growth has not been a mechanical
process in either the Soviet Union or the United States.It remains to be
seen what strength will be shown by the forces driving growth, so funda-
mentally different in the two economies.
The first thing to observe is that, even if Soviet industry were to continue
indefinitely growing faster, at any time, than U.S. industry, it might never
overtake U.S. industry in level of output, though it would get relatively
closer and closer.This would be the case if Soviet industry tended to
repeat the growth rates experienced earlier in the United States at each
successive level of output, with a similar rate of retardation. To catch up
in this way does not, of course, imply superior performance. A son will
get closer and closer percentagewise to his father in age but will never
catch up, despite the fact that every year his percentage increase in age
exceeds his father's. The absolute difference in age will never diminish.
And, similarly, the absolute difference in industrial production between
the United States and the Soviet Union may never vanish—may even
continue to increase as it has been—even if percentage growth continues
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higher in the Soviet Union than in the United States but with similar
retardations in both countries.
On the other hand, if the differentials in percentage growth already
experienced over concurrent periods were to persist long enough—if the
Soviet Union were not to duplicate the growth record of the United States
over comparable periods—Soviet output would catch up to the U.S. level
at some point in time (see Table 78). For example, if Soviet output in
TABLE 78
YEAR IN WHICH SOVIET AND U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT WOULD BE
EQUAL UNDER HYPOTHETICAL CoNDITIoNs
Assumed Average Year of Equality
Annual Growt/z Rate 1f1955 Soviet-U.S.
(per cent) Output Ratio Was
Soviet UnionUnited States 22% 33%
TOTAL OUTPUT
4.1 3.8 2515 2355
6.5 3.8 2016 1998
9.6 5.3 1993 1983
7.1 2.2 1985 1979
PER CAPITA OUTPUT
3.5 2.5 2132 2086
5.8 2.6 2011 1997
7.8 3.5 1997 1966
5.4 0.5 1991 1982
NOTE: The pairs of growth rates apply as follows, from top to bottom: 1913-1955,
1928—1955, 1950—1955, 1955—1958 for the Soviet Union and 1955—1959 for the United
States.
1955 is taken as 22 per cent of the U.S. level and the respective growth
rates over 1928—1955 are projected indefinitely into the future, total and
per capita industrial outputs in the two countries would become equal
about a half century from now. Even as the percentage gap steadily
closed under these conditions, the absolute gap would continue to increase
in favor of the United States for more than thirty years from now.29
If Soviet output in 1955 were taken as 33 per cent of the U.S.
conventional but, in our opinion, less reliable estimate—Soviet industrial
output would overtake the U.S. level about four decades from now. Under
a variety of similar assumptions, the time required for overtaking could
range from two to sixty decades.
At the point of maximum absolute gap, which would be reached around 1992,
value added of industry in 1954 dollars would be about $600 billion for the United
States and about $340 billion for the Soviet Union.
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Finally, it is not out of the question that the Soviet growth rate might
retard to, or even below, the U.S. rate before outputs have become equal
in the two countries. In this case, Soviet industry would stop catching up
and never overtake in level of output.
In a word, many things can happen, none of them inconsistent with
what we know about the mysterious subject of economic growth. This
should make us pause before making hasty estimates of the comparative
future performance of Soviet and U.S. industry.
Annex to Chapter 8
Soviet Lags in Industrial Output Behind the United States
As mentioned in the body of this chapter, one way to assess comparative
performance of Soviet and U.S. industry is to make an industry-by-
industry study of the behavior of Soviet lags behind the United States in
physical output. Such a study is presented here.3° The rationale under-
lying it is that most individual industries tend, in the Soviet Union as well
as elsewhere, to grow more slowly percentagewise as they get older and
larger. Comparison of U.S. and Soviet growth rates over contemporane-
ous periods may therefore give a misleading impression of relative
economic performance to the extent that mature U.S. industries are being
compared with youthful Soviet counterparts.Analysis of Soviet lags
behind U.S. output provides a simple and direct method of comparing
growth over periods in which Soviet and U.S. industries were of equivalent
size.
For example, in 1913 the Russian production of steel ingots within the
interwar Soviet territory was roughly equal in metric tons to the produc-
tion achieved in the United States around 1892, or twenty-one years
earlier. Hence the lag in 1913 was twenty-one years. The lag had risen
to thirty-two years in 1937, falling somewhat from that point to a level of
twenty-nine years in 1955 and nineteen years in 1958, when it leapt across
the gap caused by the Great Depression.Thus Soviet production of
steel ingots was eight years further behind American production in 1955
than it had been in 1913, which is to say that it has taken the Soviet
Union forty-two years (19 13—1955) to accomplish what the United States
had done in thirty-four (1892—1926). On the other hand, in 1958 it was
two fewer years behind than in 1913, so that the Soviet Union in this
period (1913—1958) accomplished in forty-five years what the United
States did in forty-seven years (1892—1939). On a per capita basis, the
30Thediscussion here is essentially an extension and revision of my earlier report,
Some Observations on Soviet Industrial Growth, NBER Occasional Paper 55, New York, 1957.
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lag increased from thirty years in 1913 to forty in 1937, and to forty-nine
in both 1955 and 1958. Production per capita was nineteen years further
behind in 1955 and 1958 than it had been in 1913; an equal expansion
in per capita output had taken place in the United States in twenty-three
or twenty-six years, instead of forty-two or forty-five.
Making comparisons of this sort for a number of industries raises the
familiar problems of defining each industry in a relevant way and of
finding comparable industrial categories for different economies.3'In
general, the industries—it is perhaps more accurate to say
—chosen for study here are the most narrowly defined categories for
which the Soviet Union has published data on physical output covering
the entire Soviet period. Relying on narrow concepts of industries makes
for obvious difficulties in interpreting differences in growth between
economies with differing endowments of resources. These difficulties can
be counteracted in part by making comparisons between broadly defined
industrial categories.One such comparison is made below between
energy-producing industries taken as a whole.32
It goes without saying that, even under the best of conditions as far
as reliability of data and relevance of counterpart industries are concerned,
marked differences are to be expected between the details of industrial
growth in the two countries. This industry will grow more rapidly in the
United States than in the Soviet Union, while that one will grow more
slowly. Where retardation in growth has been so strong in the United
States as to cause output of an industry to reach a peak and then decline,
there can be the seeming paradox of an increasing Soviet lag despite the
fact that Soviet output has come to exceed the U.S. level, as in the case of
soap. The two countries have had, in the periods compared, different
levels of technological achievement, different economic tastes or objectives,
and dissimilar resource endowments. For the purpose at hand, the focus
should therefore not be so much on the details of the comparison as on the
general outline.
In Tables 79 and 80, the Soviet lag in both total and per capita output
is listed for forty-seven industries as of a number of benchmark dates,
For comments on some of the difficulties in selecting counterparts, see footnote 16
of this chapter.
32Takingenergy-producing industries as an example, we find that the petroleum
industry has shown a much more rapid development in the United States than in the
Soviet Union over comparable periods, while the coal industry has not. The compara-
tively slower growth of coal output in the United States is essentially the result of an
earlier shift to other sources of energy than occurred in the Soviet Union, not of any
relatively depressive factors applicable to the energy-producing industry as a whole.It
is therefore useful to examine comparative developments in the entire energy-producing
industry as well as in its components.
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LAG OF SOVIET UNION BEHIND UNITED STATES IN OUTPUT,







Iron ore 28 49 36 35 15 14
d d
Pigiron 30 48 36 47 39 18 13 10
Steel ingots 21 36 32 38 29 19 17 14
Rolled steel 27 42 35 38 29 18 16 14
Copper 32 47 50 51 51 n.a. 51 n.a.
Lead 94 103 60 62 52na. 49 n.a.
Zinc 46 62 43 50 46 n.a. 46 n.a.
Electricpower 13 26 21 24 16 15 13 12
Coal 45 58 49 48 47
d d
Coke 31 46 36 44 30 18 n.a. n.a.
Crude petroleum 14 26 26 35 34 25 26 19
Natural gas 32 44 52 51 51 34 n.a. 17
Sodaash 23 36 31 36 24n.a. 22n.a.
Caustic soda 20 33 25 29 24n.a. 22n.a.
Sulfuric acid 20 31 24 30 19 19n.a.n.a.
Mineral fertilizer 43 52 27 13 12 13
Syntheticdyes 10 12 15 14 11n.a.n.a.n.a.
Paper 44 53 46 54 54 54 52 50
Motor vehicle tires 12 24 25 36 39 42n.a.n.a.
(1 ci Cement 19 32 33 42 32 9
Construction gypsum 13 33 31 42 35n.a.n.a.n.a.
Construction lime 33+ 48+51 11 7n.a.n.a.n.a.
Lumber 62 77 66 67 61 59 62
Rails 42 61 57 53 52n.a.na.n.a.
d ci Windowglass 13 19 0 9 10 6
Railroad freight cars 33 48 51 62 69 71 72n.a.
Railroad passenger cars 21 43 46 59 53 57 54n.a.
Flour
ci d d d d n.a.n.a.n.a.
Butter 21 39 38 37 35 30 31
d
Vegetableoil 5 17 26 35 28 19 15 16
Meat slaughtering 36 58 64 66 65 59 46 23
Sausages 39 53 36 41 38 12n.a.n.a.
Fish catch —11 26 4 14
d ci ci ci
Soap 43 50 52 53 52 50n.a.n.a.
Salt 17 29 32 37 36n.a.na.ri.a.
ci d
Rawsugar consumption 26 42 35 47 45 35
Canned food 49 62 45 50 44 44 46n.a.
Beer 4258+66 72 73n.a.n.a.n.a.
Cigarettes —1 8 11 18 16 17n.a.n.a.
Boots and shoes 24+39+44 53 44 33 18 14
Rubber foOtwear 14+29+19 n.a.n.a.n.a.
Cottonfabrics 36 40 44 57 48 50 46 49
Pure silk and nylon fabricse 27 62 51 63 67 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Rayonand mixed fabricse 16 38 37 21 21 na. n.a. n.a.
Woolen and worsted fabrics 59 73 83 90 65 56 23 22
Bicycles 14+29+38+15
(I (I n.a.
Sewing machines 14+29+38+51 +
d ci n.a.
Mediant 29 44 36 38 35 22 19 12
Notes on page 275.
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LAG OF SOVIET UNIoN BEHIND UNITED STATES IN PER CAPITA OuTPur,
BENCHMARK DATES, FORTY-SEVEN INDUs-rRIEsa
Lag (number ofyears) as of





Iron ore 73 88+52 54 55 51 46
Pig iron 48 84 52 56 57 55 53
Steel ingots 30 46 40 49 49 47 39
Rolled steel 28+43+50 52 50 47 39
Copper 52 69 57 65 n.a. 65 n.a.
Lead 105+120+109 76 n.a. 75 n.a.
Zinc 53 68 57 59 n.a. 56 n.a.
Electric power 14 27 26 25 20 20 18
Coal 66 80 69 69 64 63 68
Coke 36 53 49 56 57 n.a.n.a.
Crude petroleum 27 40 34 41 38 39 32
Natural gas 33 45 52 69 49 n.a. 23
Soda ash 27 40 43 45na. 33 n.a.
Caustic soda 19 34 40 35 n.a. 30 n.a.
Sulfuric acid 26 38 32 34 35 n.a.n.a.
Mineral fertilizer 43+58+40 16 17 15 b
Synthetic dyes 14+ 12 20 18 n.a.n.a.n.a.
Paper 549-69+67 71 70 70 71
Motor vehicle tires 13 26 31 42 44 n.a. n.a.
Cement 30 45 38 47 38 10 b
Construction gypsum 17 43 36 49 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Constructionlime 33+48+57+75+na.n.a.n.a.
Lumber 114+129+102 111 113 115 116
Rails 63 78+ 77 84 n.a.n.a.na.
Window glass 34+44 —2 15 11 b b
Railroad freight cars 33+48+57+75+78+80+n.a.
Railroad passenger cars 30 48+57 69 71 66 n.a.
Flour b b b n.a. n.a. n.a.
Butter 30 46 50 58 49 49 44
Vegetable oil 16 28 40 44 43 37 38
Meat slaughtering 33+48+57+75+78+80+85+
Sausages 24±39±48±59 54 n.a.n.a.
Fishcatch 33+48+57+ 19 10 b b
Soap 34+49+58+ 76+79+ n.a. n.a.
Salt 33+ 43 46 58 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Raw sugar consumption 43+58+ 66 79 68 60 49
Canned food 43+58+ 62 60 58 56 n.a.
Beer 43+58+67+85+ n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cigarettes 0 11 16 23 23 n.a. n.a.
Boots and shoes 23+38+47+65+68+70+ 75+
Rubber footwear 14+29+38+56+ n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cottonfabrics 43+58+67+85+88+87 95+
Pure silk and nylon fabricsc 38 58+ 64 82 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Rayonand mixed fabricsc 14+29+38+23 n.a.n.a.n.a.
Woolenand worsted fabrics 43+58+67+85+88+90+95+
Bicycles 14+29+38+ 7 b b n.a.
Sewing machines 14+29+38+ b b b n.a.
Mediand d 56 52 51 44
Noteson page 275.
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including the 1960 and 1965 Plans. More continuous measures may be
made as desired from the graphs of output series in Chart A-2. The
sample of industries has been dictated by availability of data on physical
output, but it does cover a fair number of so-called "basic" industrial
materials and consumer "staples." As we have already noted (see Table
70), it is more representative, and increasingly so, of Soviet industry than
of U.S. industry, at least since 1913. When U.S. industry of the latter
nineteenth century is substituted in this comparison, the differential
certainly narrows, though we cannot say by how much. We can say this:
the Soviet lags calculated from estimates of aggregate industrial produc-
tion in the two countries are generally somewhat longer than the median
lags calculated from our list of industries; and this suggests that the list
comprehends a larger portion of Soviet industrial production than it does
of the U.S. production of some thirty to forty years earlier.
Notes for Table 79
SOURCE: Appendixes B and E; announced goals of the Sixth Five Year Plan (Current
Digest, VIII, 3, pp. 3 if) and of the Seven Year Plan (ibid, XI, 9, pp 3 if).
aU.S.output taken as centered nine-year moving average, with minor modifications.
Soviet output covers interwar territory of the Soviet Union for 1913, 1928, and 1937;
postwar territory for other years. A Soviet lead is indicated by a negative sign before the
figure. Where U.S. data do not go back far enough to give the full lag, the calculable lag
is followed by a plus sign. For basic data, see Chart A-2 and Appendixes B and E.
b Based on original goals of Sixth Five Year Plan, since discontinued.
Based on goals of Seven Year Plan, taken as midpoints of the given range of "control
figures." For lumber, meat slaughtering, butter, and vegetable oil, goals apply to a smaller
coverage than for earlier years; they have been adjusted upward by ratio of 1958 outputs
on larger and smaller coverage.
dSoviet output exceeds peak U.S. output to date.
0Forcombined silk, nylon, and rayon fabrics, lags are:twenty-six years for 1955,
twenty-one for 1958, and seventeen for 1965 Plan.
Calculated from data for the following numbers of industries: through 1955, forty-
seven; 1958, thirty; 1960 Plan, thirty; and 1965 Plan, twenty-one. For 1913 and 1928,
median lag cannot be precisely calculated because of lags of unknown length (lags with
plus signs); it has been taken as the approximate midpoint of bounding limits (twenty-six
and thirty-one for 1913, and forty-two and forty-seven for 1928). The median lags for the
twenty-one industries (twenty in the case of the 1960 Plan) covered for the 1965 Plan are:
1913, twenty-seven; 1928, forty-two; 1937, thirty-six; 1950, forty-two; 1955, thirty-five;
1958, twenty-five; 1960 Plan, sixteen; and 1965 Plan, twelve.
Notes for Table 80
SOURCE: Table C-3 and other sources given in Table 79.
aSeenotes a, b, and c of Table 79. Soviet population is taken as 212 million in 1960 and
229 million in 1965.
b Soviet output exceeds peak U.S. output to date.
CForcombined silk, nylon, and rayon fabrics, lags are:forty-one years for 1955,
thirty for 1958, and twenty-eight for the 1965 Plan.
d For 1913, 1928, and 1937, the median lag cannot be calculated because of lags with
unknown length (lags with plus signs); the median must exceed thirty-one for 1913, forty-
five for 1928, and forty-eight for 1937. Medians cover only thirty-two industries for 1958,
twenty for the 1960 Plan, and twenty-one for the 1965 Plan.
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CHANCESIN LAG OF SOViET UNION BEHIND UNiTED STATES ZN OUTPUT,





1928 1937 1950 1955 1955 1955 Plan
Iron ore 21—13 —1—20 —13—34 —15-1-
Pigiron 18—12 11—8 9 —9—29
Steelingots 15 —4 6 —9 8 —7—15
Rolledsteel 15 —7 3 —9 2—13 —15
Copper 15 3 1 0 19 4 nsa.
Lead 9—43 2—10 —42—49 n.a.
Zinc 16—19 7 —4 0—16 n.a.
Electric power 13 —5 3 —8 3—10 —4
Coal 13 —9 —1 —1 2—11—47+
Coke 15—10 8—14 —1—16 n.a.
Crude petroleum 12 0 9 —1 20 8—15
Natural gas 12 8 —1 0 19 7—34
Soda ash 13 —5 5 —8 1 —12 n.a.
Caustic soda 13 —8 3 —4 4 —9 n.a.
Sulfuric acid 11 —7 6—11 —1 —12 n.a.
Mineral fertilizer 9—25—14 —1 —31—40—12+
Synthetic dyes 2 3 —1 —3 1 —1 n.a.
Paper 9 —7 8 0 10 1 —4
Motor vehicle tires 12 1 11 3 27 15 n.a.
Cement 13 1 9—10 13 0—32+
Construction gypsum 20 —2 11 —7 22 2 n.a.
Construction lime 15 —40 —4 —26+ —41-I-n.a.
Lumber 15 —11 1 —6 —1—16 —61-F-
Rails 19 —4 —4 —1 10 —9 ri.a.
Window glass 6—19 9 1 —3 —9—10+
Railroad freight cars 15 3 11 7 36 21na.
Railroad passenger cars 22 3 13 —6 32 10 n.a.
Flour C C C C C C n.a.
Butter 18 —1 —1 —2 14 —4—35+
Vegetable oil 12 9 9 —7 23 11 —12
Meat slaughtering 22 6 2 —1 29 1—42
Sausages 14—17 5 —3 —1—15 n.a.
Fish catch 37—22 10—14+ C —26+
C
Soap 7 2 1 —1 9 2 n.a.
Salt 12 3 5 —1 19 7 n.a.
Raw sugar consumption 16 —7 12 —2 19 3—45+
Cannedfood 13—17 5—6 —5—18 n.a.
Beer 16+ c 6 1 31 d n.a.
Cigarettes 9 3 7 —2 17 8 n.a.
Bootsand shoes C b 9 9 b b
Rubber footwear 15—10+ —19+
C —14+—29+n.a.
Cotton fabrics 4 4 13 —9 12 8 1
Pure silk and nylon fabrics 35 —9 12 4 40 5 e
Rayonand mixed fabrics 22 —1—16 0 5 —17
Woolen and worsted fabrics 14 10 7—25 6 —8—43
Bicycles d b 23+ —15+—14+ —29+n.a.
Sewing machines 15+
C 13—51+—14+ —29+ n.a.
15 —5 6 —4 8—9—22
Noteson page 277.
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Cyclical fluctuations have been smoothed out of the U.S. output series—
essentially through centered nine-year moving averages—so that com-
parisons would not be made with unusual temporary peaks in U.S. output.
On the other hand, Soviet series have not been similarly smoothed
because their fluctuations are fundamentally different in nature from our
own cycles, and also because sharp discontinuities in the series create
serious technical problems. Similarly, no adjustment has been made for
gains in Soviet output resulting from territorial expansion during and
after World War II; that is, such gains are included in the Soviet data.
Therefore, on these scores as well as those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the lags are computed favorably for the Soviet Union, at
least as a general rule.33
Bearing in mind the various qualifications that must attend analysis
of lags, we note (Table 79) that the median lag in output—that is to say,
the lag exceeded in the case of half the industries and fallen short of in the
case of the other half—was twenty-nine years in 1913, thirty-six years in
1937, and thirty-five years in 1955. By this measure of average per-
formance, Soviet industrial growth over forty-two years (1913—1955) is
seen to correspond roughly with U.S. industrial growth over thirty-six
years (1885—1921). Put in terms of changes in lags, the increase in median
lag was six years over the period 1913—1955, broken down into an increase
of seven years for 1913—1937 and a decrease of one year for 1937—1955.
Quite similar conclusions are reached on the basis of median changes in
lags (see Table 81).Moreover, we may note that thirty-one out of
forty-four industries for which changes and lags can be measured showed
an increase for 1913—1955.
Smoothing by a moving average may cause the average to be persistently above
actual output when output is rising rapidly and consistently. Hence, in a few cases, lags
may have been lengthened for earlier benchmark dates beyond what they would have
been under other smoothing devices, though never by more than one or two years.It
was considered preferable to adhere to a mechanical rule for smoothing and calculating
lags, rather than to try to make minor improvements by ad hoc methods.
Notes for Table 81
SOURCE: Table 79.
See notes a and c to Table 79. Changes in lags that cannot be precisely calculated are
footnoted or followed by a plus sign.
bProbabledecrease in lag of unknown magnitude.
CInsufficientdata to indicate whether lag increased or decreased.
d Probable increase in lag of unknown magnitude.
0Forall silk, nylon, and rayon fabrics combined, decrease of nine years in lag.
Calculated from data for the following numbers of industries: 1913—1928, forty-five;
1928—1937, forty-four; 1937—1950, forty-six; 1950—1955, forty-five; 1913—1955, forty-five;
1928—1955, forty-six; and 1955—1965 Plan, twenty. For 1928—1937, taken as midpoint of
bounding limits, —4 and —6.
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The picture changes when the analysis is brought forward to 1958 and
projected to the future expected by Soviet officials. However, the sample
of industries falls sharply—to thirty-two for 1958 and twenty-one for
the 1965 Plan—so that comparison with earlier dates is impaired. On the
basis of the 1958 sample, the median lag is shown as falling from about
thirty years in 1913 to twenty-two years in 1958, a decline of eight years.
The basic reason for this sudden sharp decline in lag is that Soviet output
in a number of industries came to exceed U.S. production on both sides
of the Great Depression.Soviet performance over forty-five years is
indicated as equivalent to U.S. performance over fifty-three. On the
basis of the even smaller 1965 Plan sample of industries, the median lag
is also shown as falling but by only two years between 1913 and 1958—
from twenty-seven yearstotwenty-five years—with an additional
"planned" fall of thirteen years between the 1958 and 1965 Plans.
The median lag in per capita output (Table 80) was fifty-six years in
1955, and fifty-two years in 1958. Equally precise calculations cannot be
made for other benchmark dates because many per capita lags are so
long they cannot be measured—U.S. statistics on physical output do not
go back far enough to show output per capita as small as in the Soviet
Union.Changes in per capita lags can, however, be measured for
thirty-six industries over 1937—1955 and for twenty-nine industries over
1913—1955. The median of these changes is an increase of four years over
1937—1955 (with twenty-six out of the thirty-six industries showing an
increase) and of fourteen years over 1913—1955 (with twenty-one out of
the twenty-nine industries showing an increase). On the basis of these
figures and the median lag of fifty-six years for 1955, the median per
capita lag would be estimated as around forty-two years in 1913 and
around fifty-two years in 1937.According to our earlier calculations
from aggregative data (see footnote 27), the estimate for 1913 considerably
understates the lag at that time, so that it is best to avoid pursuing the
analysis of per capita lags any further.
The various summary statistics given so far reflect conditions in
industries where growth has been deliberately retarded by Soviet authori-
ties as well as in industries where growth has been promoted. The
difference in performance between the neglected and favored sectors may
be indicated in part by computing separate summary statistics for
industries producing consumer goods, on the one hand, and for all other
industries, on the other hand. This is done in Table 82, where the last
twenty items in Table 79 are taken as consumer goods, and the first
twenty-seven items as "other goods." The median lags fbr consumer goods
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TABLE 82
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SovIET LAGS BROKEN DOWN BY INDUSTRIES
PRODUCING CONSUMER AND OTHER GOODS
(number of years)
Sample of 47 Industries
Energy-
Producing Consumer Other
All Goodsa Goodsa Industryb
MEDIAN LACe
1913 29c1 26 42
1928 44U 46e 43 56
1937 36 38 36 46
1950 42 44 42 49
1955 35 37 34 48
CHANGE IN MEDIAN LAG°
1913—1928 +16 +15 +17 +14
1928—1937 —8 —8 —7 —10
1937—1950 +6 +6 +6 +3
1950—1955 —7 —7 —8 —1
1913—1955 +7 +6 +8 +6
1928—1955 —9 —9 —9 —8
SOURCE: Table 79 and technical note 9 of Appendix A.
a Consumer goods are taken as the last twenty items in Table 79; other goods, as the
remaining twenty-seven.
Excludes firewood. For reasons, see technical note 9 of Appendix A.
For energy-producing industry, lag in aggregate output as measured in thermal units.
All changes in median lag agree in direction with median changes in lags that can be
calculated from Table 79.
d Midpoints of possible bounding limits (twenty-six and thirty-one for 1913, and forty-
two and forty-seven for 1928) consistent with lags of imprecise length (lags with plus
signs).
eCalculatedfrom bounding limits (twenty-four and thirty-eight for 1913, and thirty-
nine and fifty-three for 1928) consistent with lags of imprecise length.
are smaller in 1913 and larger in 1937 and 1955 than the median lags for
other goods. That is to say, consumer goods have tended to grow more
slowly relative to their American counterparts than other goods have.
Despite this fact, the medians for nonconsumer goods do not differ
significantly from those for all industries taken together.
Another line of evidence on this general issue leads to a similar con-
clusion. The production of energy may be taken as an indicator of
industrial growth, particularly of growth in so-called "basic" industries.
One way of estimating the production of energy is to translate the output
of coal, petroleum, and so on into their energy content (in, say, British
thermal units) and add the energy contents together. This has been done
for U.S. and Soviet energy-producing industries to the extent permitted by
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available data (see Table A-27 and A-28 and Chart A-4). It will be seen
(Table 82) that Soviet production of energy has lagged further behind
U.S. production than is the case for our sample of forty-seven industries,
but between 1913 and 1955 the lag increased by about the same number
of years.34
We might next raise the question whether Soviet performance relative
to the United States resembles Russian performance in the Tsarist
TABLE 83
LAG OF RussIA BEHIND UNITED STATES IN OUTPUT,
BENCHMARK DATES BETWEEN 1880 AND 1913, THIRTEEN INDUSTRIESa
Lag (number ofyears) Increase or Decrease (—)in Lag
1880 1900 19131880—19001900—19131880—1913
Iron ore 36+ 21 27 —15+ 6 —9+
Pig iron 36 22 29 —14 7 —7
Steel ingots 5 14 20 9 6 15
Copper 25 37 33 12 —4 8
Lead 67 92+92 25+ —0+ 25
Zinc 11 29 35 18 8 24
Coal 36 39 43 3 4 7
Crude petroleum 16 —1 14 —17 15 —2
Rails 22 31 40 9 9 18
Salt —1 3 16 4 13 17
Raw sugar consumption10+24 22 —2 b
Cigarettes —9—10 —3 — 1 7 6
Cotton Consumption 32 24 29 —8 5 —3
Median 22 24 29 4 6 8
SOURCE: Appendixes B and E.
aRussianoutput covers Tsarist territory excluding Finland.
b Inadequate data to indicate whether lag increased or decreased.
period.Such infov.mation as could be gathered on this question is
presented in Table 83, where Russian lags are computed for thirteen
industries as of three benchmark dates: 1880, 1900, and 1913. As far as
this very small sample of industries is concerned, there is a clear tendency
for lags to increase. Russian growth in output over thirty-three years of
the Tsarist period (1880—1913) is indicated as corresponding roughly
If firewood isincluded as an energy source, the lag in energy production shows a
decline over 1913—1955.It is doubtful that much weight should be placed on this last
finding, however, since estimates of output of firewood in both the United States and the
Soviet Union are necessarily crude and subject to wide margins of error (see the discussion
in the text around Tables A-27 and A.28).
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with U.S. growth over twenty-six earlier years (1858—1884), but this
conclusion is based on too small a sample to be taken literally.35
Finally, we may note that Soviet lags have declined substantially over
the Plan years taken alone. Since Soviet industry experienced virtually
no growth in the aggregate between 1913 and 1928, the median lag in
output increased by fifteen years between 1913 and 1928 (see Table 79).
Beginning with 1928, the median lag decreased by nine years by 1955 and
by twenty-two years by 1958. Soviet output of these industries attained in
twenty-seven (or thirty) years a growth that required thirty-six (or
fifty-two) years in the United States.
The question remains whether this more rapid growth since 1928
represents the establishment of a new trend, or whether it is in part
explained by a process of catching up to an interrupted trend. No firm
answer can yet be given to this question, but there is some relevant evidence
that can be examined, namely, the performance of Soviet industries that
have essentially come into existence during the period 1928—1955.If
these new Soviet industries have also gained historical ground on their
American counterparts, then there is good support for the belief that a
new, more rapid trend of Soviet growth has been established. If not, there
is less reason to believe so. The data so far available for fifteen new Soviet
industries (Table 84) do not indicate a decline in median lag since 1932,
at least through 1958. The Soviet lag has clearly decreased in only three
of the fifteenindustries:primary aluminum, electric motors, and
margarine.
As evidence on the other side, it should be pointed out that Soviet
authorities look forward to a much more rapid rate of industrial expansion
in the future than has characterized the Soviet period as a whole. The
planned goals for 1960, since abandoned, and for 1965 imply considerable
ground-gaining on the United States in a large number of industries, in
part because of an implied leap across our Great Depression in the case
of many products. It remains to be seen to what extent Soviet authorities
will be correct in their anticipations.
The sample does not seem to be representative of conditions in 1913. We note from
the sample of forty-seven industries in Table 79 that the median lag in Russian output
within the interwar territory of the Soviet Union is calculated as twenty-nine years.
When Russian output is taken within Tsarist territory, the median lag should be smaller,
since Tsarist territory was larger than interwar Soviet territory. Contrary to this expecta-
tion, the median lag turns out to be the same (see Table 83). Unfortunately, there is no




LAG OF SOVIET UNION BEHIND UNITED STATES IN OUTPUT,
BENCHMARK DATES SINCE 1932, FIFTEEN NEW SOVIET INDUSTRIES
Increase or
Decrease (—)




Primary aluminum 35 22 16n.a.n.a.n.a. n.a. n.a.
Automobiles 33 39 41 46 49 16 19
Trucks and buses 18 19 22 29 32 34 14 16
Tractors 15 20 33 32 30 19 15 4
Tractor-drawn plows 9 11 18 22 29 18 20 9
Tractor-drawn .
cultivators 3 1 11 12 16 14 13 11
Grain combines 6—5 13 7 12 11 6 5
Diesel 10 13 16 8 12n.a. 2 n.a.
Electric motorsb 15 19 22 6 9 4 —6 —11
Margarine 26 23 20 9 6 7c—20—19
Cheese 63+68+71+81 75n.a. d n.a.
Hosiery 42+36 37 47 45 44 d
Phonographs 33+22 32 40 35n.a. n.a.
Radios 11 14 17 26 26 26 15 15
Television sets e e e 3 7 9 e e
Median 17 20 21 24 28 18 14 9
SOURCE: Appendixes B and E.
a From 1933.
bOutputmeasured in rated capacity, not simple units.
CFrom1957.
dInsufficientdata to indicate whether lag increased or decreased.
Output negligible before 1950
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